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Good morning.  Thank you for the opportunity to be here at the Villanova School of Business to 
address this second annual Business Leaders Forum.   
 
As leaders engaged in our business community, you are all aware of the painfully protracted 
pace of our economic recovery.  I have been saying for quite some time that this was going to be 
a long, slow recovery.  Moreover, this frustrating state of affairs continues despite 
extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy.   
 
In my remarks today, I will discuss my outlook for the U.S. economy, as well as my views on the 
appropriate current and future monetary policy.  As always, my remarks reflect my own views 
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Board or my colleagues on 




Let me begin with an update on the U.S. economy.  Clearly, this year has not played out as 
almost anyone forecasted.  Indeed, from the revisions to the government’s economic data in 
July, we now know that the recession was deeper and the recovery was weaker than we had 
previously thought.   Some of this year’s weakness is understandable.  We began the year with 
severe snowstorms in the East, then the earthquake and ensuing disasters in Japan, followed by 
the unrest in the Middle East and North Africa and the run-up in oil prices, and a lingering 
concern about sovereign debt in Europe.  And all of that occurred before May. 
 
With the arrival of summer, we faced another round of problems with the worsening of the 
European sovereign debt crisis, as well as our own fracas on fiscal policy and the debt ceiling  
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debates in Washington.  These events all weighed heavily on business and consumer 
confidence. 
 
While many of these factors are transitory, and each will wane eventually, the cumulative effect 
has served to feed uncertainty and inhibit growth. 
 
Indeed, growth in the first half of 2011 was much weaker than anticipated.   In light of this 
performance most forecasters have revised down their forecasts for overall growth in 2011. 
Indeed, at the beginning of the year, I was expecting GDP growth in 2011 to be 3 to 3.5 percent. 
Now, I expect GDP growth to be less than 2 percent in 2011, but to gradually accelerate to 
around 3 percent in 2012.   
 
Although the downside risks around this forecast are significant, I do not believe the current 
data signal that we are on the precipice of a so-called double-dip recession.  Indeed, many of my 
business contacts suggest that while growth is very sluggish and uneven, they do not see the 
precipitous declines that the news headlines suggest.  
 
Instead, their stories are consistent with a slow recovery due to the very nature of the recession 
from which we have emerged.  The financial crisis was a severe shock that impacted many 
economies around the world and led to a recession of great depth and structural imbalances.  
Some sectors, such as financial services and construction, may never return to their pre-
recession shares of our economy.  The aftermath of the financial stress and the weak housing 
sector will weigh on the pace of recovery for some time to come.   
 
Consumer and Business Spending 
 
One of the more striking aspects of this recession is the continued weakness in consumer 
spending.  While there were modest increases last year, spending decelerated notably over the 
first half of the year.  Partly this reflects the effect of higher oil prices we saw earlier in the year.  
Partly it reflects the continued deleveraging of the household balance sheet, as consumers pay 
down debt and work to rebuild their net worth.  Most observers agree that weak income growth 
and falling house prices are restraining spending and we are unlikely to see strong consumer 
spending as long as we face a depressed housing market and a weak labor market.   
 
Another way to view weak consumption is to note that households are continuing to restructure 
their balance sheets – saving more and consuming less.  This is a perfectly natural and rational 
reaction to events.  Until these households perceive that they have restored a balance to their 
long-run consumption and saving patterns commensurate with their earnings profile, they will 
not increase spending.  Moreover, the more uncertain they are about their own earning power, 
the more reluctant households will be to increase spending and the more they will feel the need 




A brighter spot has been business investment spending, which has been supported by solid 
growth in corporate earnings.  Looking through the month-to-month volatility, spending on 
equipment and software has continued to expand.  
 
Indicators from business surveys, including the Philadelphia Fed’s Business Outlook Survey of 
manufacturers, suggest some weakening in conditions, although it is too soon to tell whether 
this will be persistent.  
 
Many have taken note of the weakness in our monthly survey, since it has proven to be a useful 
gauge for national trends in manufacturing.  In August and September, the measures of current 
activity were negative.  But our polling in August coincided with market volatility in the 
aftermath of Standard & Poor’s downgrade of U.S. debt.  Measures of future activity have 
remained positive, and September was stronger than August, suggesting that firms expect 
activity to pick up over the next six months.  
 
Recent volatility in financial markets has contributed to sharp declines in business and consumer 
sentiment.  But with a high degree of uncertainty over future taxes, regulations, and the 
financial ramifications of the European sovereign debt situation, it is no wonder that sentiment 




Conditions in labor markets remain a serious challenge.  Given the weak growth so far this year, 
we have not made even the modest progress on reducing unemployment rates that forecasters 
anticipated.  Most recently, nonfarm payroll employment was flat in August, and the 
unemployment rate remained at 9.1 percent.  Private payrolls added just 17,000 jobs, far below 
what we will need to see just to keep pace with changes in the labor force.  Ongoing budget 
pressures faced by state and local governments have led to cuts in public payrolls.   
 
These numbers are troubling, especially when more than 40 percent of the unemployed, or 
some 6 million people, have been out of work for 27 weeks or longer.   This underscores that we 
should not expect any easy solution.  Millions of unemployed workers may take longer to find 
jobs because their skills have depreciated or they may need to seek employment in other 
sectors.  These structural issues will take time to resolve.  Jobs and workers will need to be 
reallocated across the economy, which is a long and slow process.   
 
Thus, while I expect a moderate recovery to continue and to strengthen over time, I expect to 
see only modest declines in the unemployment rate, with probably little change over the rest of 
this year, and then falling to a range of 8 to 8½ percent by the end of 2012. 
 





Let me now turn to my outlook for inflation.  Just as growth has been weaker this year than 
many forecasters had anticipated, inflation has been higher than expected.  Monthly changes in 
inflation have moderated slightly from those seen earlier in the year when the prices of many 
commodities, including oil, were rising sharply.  However, measured on a year-over-year basis, 
both total inflation and core inflation continue to advance.  I do anticipate that with many 
commodity prices now leveling off or falling, and inflation expectations relatively stable, 
inflation will moderate in the near term.   
 
However, we must continue to monitor this situation, particularly in this environment of very 
accommodative monetary policy.  Indeed, it is good to remember that the current inflationary 
environment is quite different from the one we faced a year ago when we embarked on the so-
called QE2 policy to purchase $600 billion of long-term U.S. Treasuries.  At the time, there were 
concerns about deflation, whereas now inflation is running above our long-run goal.  I would 
also note that unemployment was higher last fall than it is today.  Thus, with inflation higher and 
unemployment lower, it is appropriate to ask what criteria we are using to justify further 
accommodation.   In this environment, I think it is very important that we refrain from actions 
that risk fueling a steady rise in inflation or inflation expectations over the medium term.  We 
must not become too sanguine that high unemployment will lead to low inflation.  The lesson of 
the 1970s is clear – high unemployment or low resource utilization is not sufficient to prevent 
high rates of inflation.  The current environment in the U.K. should also be a warning.  The 
unemployment rate in Britain is near 8 percent, having risen sharply during its recession, yet 




This brings me to a discussion of the recent policy actions the Fed has taken, why I dissented 
from these actions in August and September, and what I believe should be the long-term view of 
monetary policy. 
 
As I noted at the beginning of my remarks, the economic conditions of the past few years have 
led to extraordinary monetary policy accommodation.  To date, our actions have led to a level of 
the federal funds rate — the traditional instrument of monetary policy — that has been near 
zero for almost three years.  The Fed’s balance sheet has grown more than threefold, from 
nearly $900 billion before the crisis to about $2.9 trillion today, and its asset composition has 
shifted significantly from mostly short- to medium-term Treasuries to longer-term Treasuries, 
mortgage-backed securities, and agency debt.  This extraordinary degree of monetary 
accommodation has played a role in supporting the recovery thus far, and it continues to do so.   
 
In August, the FOMC changed its guidance about its expectations for the future path of the 
federal funds rate.  In particular, it stated that economic conditions were “likely to warrant  
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exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.”  At its meeting 
last week, the FOMC announced additional accommodative action.  In an effort to reduce long-
term Treasury yields from already historically low levels, the FOMC intends to purchase $400 
billion of longer-term Treasury securities and to sell an equal amount of shorter-term Treasuries 
by the end of June 2012.  This action will not increase the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, but it 
will lengthen the maturity of the Fed’s holdings.  In addition, the FOMC will be reinvesting 
principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in 
mortgage-backed securities rather than Treasuries.  This action was intended to help support 
mortgage markets. 
 
I dissented from these decisions because I believe that they will do little to improve the near-
term prospects for economic growth or employment and they do pose risks.  Policy actions 
should never be considered free and should be evaluated based on the costs and benefits.  
Based on our experience with Operation Twist in the 1960s and with last year’s QE2, the 
reduction in long-term rates is likely to be less than 20 basis points for the 10-year Treasury 
yield, which is currently only 2 percent.  The pass-through to the rates at which consumers and 
businesses actually borrow is likely to be much less.  Thus, I am skeptical that this will do much 
to spur businesses to hire or consumers to spend, given the ongoing structural adjustments 
occurring in the economy and the uncertainties posed by the fiscal challenges both here and 
abroad.   
 
In addition to having little effect, the actions come with significant potential costs.  We have 
provided a great deal of monetary accommodation to the economy, and given the stubbornness 
of the unemployment rate in responding to these efforts, we should be cautious and vigilant 
that our previous accommodative policies do not translate into a steady rise in inflation over the 
medium term even while the unemployment rate remains elevated.    Creating an environment 
of stagflation, reminiscent of the 1970s, will not help businesses, the unemployed, or the 
consumer.  It is an outcome we must carefully guard against.   
 
We also need to ensure that Fed policy remains credible.  In my view, the actions taken in 
August and September tend to undermine the Fed’s credibility by giving the impression that we 
think such policies can have a major impact on the speed of the recovery.  It is my assessment 
that they will not.  We should not take certain actions simply because we can.  To address our 
economic ills we must apply the appropriate remedies.  A doctor who misdiagnoses a disease 
and prescribes the wrong medicine can make the patient worse.  The ills we currently face are 
not readily resolved through ever more accommodative monetary policy.  If we act as if the Fed 
has the ability to solve all our economic problems, the credibility of the institution is 
undermined.  The loss of that credibility and confidence could be costly to the economy because 
it will make it much harder for the Fed to implement effective monetary policy in the future.     
 
Credibility was also at the center of my opposition to changing the forward policy guidance in 
August.  I was concerned that tying monetary policy to calendar time could be misinterpreted by  
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the public as suggesting that monetary policy is no longer contingent on how the economic 
outlook evolves.  This could also lead to a loss of credibility should economic conditions develop 
in a way that requires the federal funds rate to be adjusted prior to mid-2013.  And in my view, 
given the outlook, economic conditions will likely warrant that the Fed begin to raise rates 
before that time. 
 
Finally, the actions taken at our last meeting will make our exit from this period of extraordinary 
accommodation more complicated.  We will have more long-term Treasury securities and more 
mortgage-backed securities in our portfolio, which may extend the time it will take to withdraw 
from allocating credit to particular sectors of the economy and return to our stated goal of an 
all-Treasuries portfolio.  
 
This does not mean that I see no circumstances in which further monetary policy action should 
be taken.  Should the developments in the euro area lead to significant financial market 
disruptions, the Fed would need to respond in its role of lender of last resort to support financial 
stability and the payments system.  Or if deflationary fears were to become a real threat again 
and we saw signs that the economy was moving to a sustained disinflation with declining 
inflation rates and inflation expectations, then we would need to consider further action to 
stabilize inflation expectations.  I do not see either of these scenarios in my forecast, so I do not 
anticipate that further accommodative monetary policy actions will need to be taken. 
 
An Explicit Numerical Objective for Inflation 
 
The past three years have proven to be challenging times for monetary policymakers.  We 
entered unprecedented territory as we employed new policy tools to stem the financial crisis 
and limit the damage to the economy from the severe economic recession.  There was no 
established framework for making policy decisions in such an environment, and that added to 
the difficulties in determining appropriate policy.  It also created difficulties for the Fed’s 
communications.  In my view, a high priority for the Fed must be to strengthen our monetary 
policy framework and articulate that framework to the public so that they will better 
understand the basis for our decisions and be better able to formulate expectations of future 
policy actions.   
 
An important first step in that direction is for the Federal Reserve to adopt an explicit numerical 
objective for inflation.  The explicit inflation goal would help to anchor inflation expectations, 
raise policy transparency, and increase the central bank’s accountability for its actions.   There is 
considerable evidence that countries that have adopted such an objective as a cornerstone of 
their monetary policy decision-making have had more success at achieving price stability 
without any deterioration in the stability of real activity.  In the United States, Congress has 
given the Fed a mandate to promote the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates.  Price stability is the most effective way for monetary policy 
to promote the other two goals.  Thus, by helping the Fed achieve and maintain price stability,  
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an explicit inflation objective would help the Fed promote all three of the goals set forth by 
Congress. 
 
For nearly 20 years, I have advocated that the Fed make explicit its commitment to a numerical 
inflation objective in support of its full mandate.  I believe that now is an opportune time to do 
so.   
 
First, it will increase the credibility of our commitment to keeping prices stable even as we 
employ new, less familiar policy tools.   
 
Second, we are confronting an environment where some may be questioning the ability or 
resolve of the government to address our long-run fiscal problems.  In such an atmosphere of 
uncertainty, being explicit about our inflation goal will underscore the Fed’s commitment not to 
succumb to external pressures to use inflation as a solution to the country’s long-run deficit 
problem.  This will help anchor inflation expectations, which is critical because an undesirable 
rise or fall in inflationary expectations can generate a self-fulfilling mechanism.  Should inflation 
expectations become unhinged, it would be difficult and costly for the monetary authority to re-
establish price stability.   
 
Third, communicating an explicit inflation objective will clarify the Fed’s intentions regarding the 
level of inflation it considers consistent with its mandate.  Some economists have suggested that 
raising our inflation goal above 2 percent would be an effective tool for lowering real interest 
rates.  I am very wary of such a strategy because I don’t believe we can control inflation 
expectations that precisely.   It is at least questionable whether we could credibly raise inflation 
expectations.  And were we able to do so, how easily would we be able to bring them back 
down?  Trying to manipulate the public’s expectations may risk undermining the Fed’s credibility 
and the public’s confidence in the institution. 
 
Fourth, we eventually will need to normalize our monetary policy and exit this period of 
extraordinary accommodation.  Having an explicit inflation objective will help us maintain our 
commitment to price stability while we do that and increase the credibility of that commitment 
in the eyes of the public.   
 
As business leaders, you understand the importance of credibility in your own institutions.  An 
institution's reputation is built on its credibility for fulfilling its commitments.  Once that 
foundation is compromised, it is very difficult to rebuild.  The Fed must do all it can to preserve 
its hard-earned credibility.  I believe an explicit inflation goal can help us do that. 
 





In summary, the U.S. economic recovery will continue and gradually strengthen over time.  I 
expect annual growth of less than 2 percent this year to gradually accelerate to around 3 
percent next year.  As the economy strengthens, prospects for labor markets will continue to 
improve and the unemployment rate will gradually decline. 
 
As we move forward in this time of change, the Federal Reserve remains committed to its long-
run statutory goals of price stability and maximum employment.  We remain vigilant on inflation 
and committed to clear communication of our monetary policy.  I believe that this 
communication, and our accountability to the public, could be greatly enhanced were the Fed to 
adopt an explicit numerical inflation goal.  Having such an objective in place would prove 
particularly useful in the current environment in which the Fed is providing monetary stimulus 
using new tools that are not as familiar to the public and the markets. It will also help at a time 
when some may view the fiscal situation as threatening the independence of monetary policy. 
And it will help in the future, during the eventual exit from these extraordinarily accommodative 
measures.   